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1.  Introduction 
 
The ‘law of one price’ fails to hold in seemingly competitive goods markets, and this has long-
intrigued Economists.  Numerous models show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise from 
heterogeneous consumer search costs (e.g. Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980), but the lack 
of easily-available data meant there were initially few empirical studies of price dispersion (Pratt 
et al., 1979; Carlson and Pescatrice, 1980).   However, the arrival of the Internet has meant that 
research has flourished over recent years (e.g. Smith and Brynolfsson, 2001; Bayliss and Perloff, 
2002; Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; and Baye et al., 2004).  These studies find evidence of price 
dispersion that is consistent with a search explanation, although a direct link between individual 
search behaviour and price dispersion has yet to be firmly established.
1
 
In this paper a model of non-sequential consumer search is developed and data are taken for the 
Internet motor insurance market to test directly whether those consumers with characteristics 
associated with greater search ability face less price dispersion.  A lower search cost is implied 
by a higher ability to search, which is measured by Internet usage.  This is reasonable as more 
frequent users will typically be more Internet savvy and have a greater ability to search.  This 
‘learning-by-doing’ argument has antecedents that date back to Arrow (1962), and underpins the 
endogenous growth literature.  A desirable feature of the motor insurance market is that the price 
data (i.e. premium quotes) are matched directly to the individual consumer characteristics.  This 
means that by controlling for other factors, such as the insurance risk and the propensity to 
search, it is possible to establish a direct link between price dispersion and search ability. 
                                                 
1
 For example, Carlson and Pescatrice (1980) look across markets and find lower price dispersion for products that 
are more expensive or that are bought more frequently, which they attribute to search.  Dahlby and West (1986) 
eliminate possible non-search explanations and attribute the residual price dispersion to search, while Bayliss and 
Perloff (2002) rule-out price dispersion due to quality differences.  Perhaps the closest to establishing a direct link 
between search and price dispersion is Brown and Goolsbee (2002), who look at Internet usage over time, attributing 
the reduction in price dispersion to an increase in Internet access, but focusing primarily on the level of prices.  
 3
 The price data used in this study were gathered for a twelve month period over 2006-07 from UK 
motor insurance websites, including the leading price comparison site, confused.com, and give 
32,255 observations on prices and associated individual characteristics.  The prices are for 
average market conditions (e.g. fully comprehensive, age of car, mileage, etc), and allowed to 
vary by the age, sex and occupation of the consumer and car type.  Interest is in Internet usage 
rather than access, assuming that the prices posted online do not reflect offline search.
2
  Table 1 
shows the frequency of Internet use, and reveals that usage declines with age and is greater for 
males than for females.  This suggests that age and sex signal ability to search.  Further, it is 
reasonable that search ability will vary by occupation, as higher-skilled jobs generally require 
higher levels of education and computer use, therefore implying greater search ability. 
 
While other studies have examined the Internet and insurance markets, the novelty of this paper 
lies in establishing a direct link between search ability and price dispersion.  Of course, an 
important consideration in setting a premium is the risk associated with a policy, but we develop 
a model that predicts a negative relationship between price dispersion and search, and which is 
invariant to the presence of risk.  The model is estimated using 1,320 price sets for 22 individual 
types (by age, occupation and sex) and five car types, including terms that capture risk and the 
propensity to search.  Overall, the paper finds the ability to search is an important determinant of 
price dispersion, and that price dispersion decreases as the ability to search increases, particularly 
by age and occupation.  The next section sets out the model, Section 3 outlines the data, Section 
4 contains the empirical results and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2
 Motor insurance may be purchased either online or offline via brokers, shops or over the ‘phone.  If firms charge 
the same price to a given individual through each of these channels then the proportion of Internet users may affect 
the price distribution, à la Brown and Goolsbee (2002).  This might affect the interpretation of the results, but firms 
discriminate between Internet and non-Internet users (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000), so that it is not the case. 
   
 4
2. The Model 
 
The Internet motor insurance market is best characterised by a fixed sample, non-sequential 
search, in which consumers discover multiple prices simultaneously.  This kind of search has 
received some attention in the literature (e.g. Wilde and Schwatz, 1979; Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez, 2004), although it is less common than either sequential search (e.g. Rob, 1985; Stahl, 
1989) or the clearinghouse model (e.g. Baye et al., 2001; Morgan et al., 2006).  However, as 
some leading brands do not quote on a comparison website, neither of these two entirely fits the 
Internet motor insurance market.
3
  As a single search may yield multiple prices it cannot be 
sequential search, but neither is it the clearinghouse model as a single search cannot reveal all 
prices in the market, so that non-sequential search fits best. 
 
2.1 Non-Sequential Search
Formally, it is supposed that the market is characterised by a single homogeneous good, and a 
finite set of n (! 2) prices that can be searched, p = (p1, p2, …, pn), where 0 < p1 < p2 < …<  pn.  
There are N homogeneous individuals (i = 1, 2, …, N), such that each individual i undertakes the 
same fixed sample search of size m, where 1 ! m ! n.  When m = 1 then each price has an equal 
probability of being selected and a price is randomly chosen, but otherwise the search intensity 
increases with m.  Search reflects the ability of individuals. 
 
For prices p it is useful to consider the probability distribution of searched prices as m varies, 
from which it is possible to derive a functional form.  For a fixed sample of size m from n prices 
                                                 
3
 For the main UK motor insurance price comparison site, confused.com, at the time of data collection, four leading 
brands did not quote on this site, comprising Esure, Churchill, Direct Line and Tesco.  The last three are brands or 
underwritten by RBS, and together with Esure they have a combined market share of around 30% in 2002. 
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Continuing in the same way, it can be shown that for a fixed sample size of m from n prices (m " 
n), the probability that price pr (r = 1, 2, …, n) is selected is: 
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This holds for r " n – m + 1, while if r > n – m + 1 then prices pn-m+2 and above will never be 
searched as the lowest price, so that these have a zero probability.
5
  When r = 2 then (3) gives (2), 
and when r = 1 then r " n – m + 1 holds with equality, such that (3) reduces to (1).  When m = n 
then (3) holds for r " 1 only, and p1 is always searched as the lowest price by (1). 
 
For illustrative purposes, the probability density function of the lowest searched price is sketched 
in Figure 1 using (3).  This supposes n = 7 and 1 ! m ! 7.  Figure 1 shows that p1 is always the 
modal price, but while the distribution is uniform when m = 1, it is more concentrated about p1 as 
m increases.  This means the mean price falls with search, such that it is to equal to p1 when m = 
                                                 
4
 When m = n, so that all prices are searched, p2 is never selected as the lowest price and this probability is zero.  
5
 In fact, (3) is zero when r = n – m + 2 (m %1), but not defined for higher values of r. 
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7, while the variance of the lowest searched price is also inversely related to search and tends to 
zero as m increases.  Of interest, Figure 1 suggests that the distribution of the searched prices is 
remarkably similar to the exponential function, and algebraically it is represented by: 
 
   f p: m, p1& ' ( m exp m p1 " p& ') *,    (4) 
 
where p1 is the lowest offered price and p (+ p1) is now continuously defined.  Search increases 
with m, where 1 / m is the scale parameter.  In Appendix A it is shown f p: m, p1& 'p( p1
p(,
- (1 and 
from the moment-generating function that the mean and variance of f are:
6
 
  mean f p :m, p1& '( p1 $ 1
m
 and var f p :m, p1& '( 1
m
2 .  (5) 
 
This suggests (4) models the non-sequential search process very well.  In particular, as the search 
intensity increases, the mean price falls towards p1, while the variance tends to zero, such that in 
the limit p1 is always selected as the lowest price and the mean price is p1. 
 
2.2 The Modelling Framework 
The above function captures search behaviour, but the resulting distribution of searched prices 
(like that sketched in Figure 1) does not closely match the observed distribution of prices, where 
relatively few firms quote at the lower end.  This is because no account has been taken of the 
supply side.  Low-intensity search yields high searched-prices, but low demand at these prices 
may mean they are unprofitable and so not offered, while similarly low prices may also not be 
offered.  To model this it is supposed that there are j = 1, 2, …, J individual types and k = 1, 
2, …, K car types, where each sub-market (j, k) is homogeneous.  The car choice is exogenous, 
                                                 
6
 The usual expression for the exponential function is obtained by setting p1 = 0, in (4), in which case the mean and 
variance are 1 / m and 1 / m2 (see Dolton et al, 1989). 
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so that consumers search non-sequentially in a single sub-market only with a search intensity mjk.  
Each sub-market has Njk individuals and a distribution of prices prjk, where r = 1, 2, …, njk.
7
 
To model the motor insurance market we focus on a single sub-market (j, k).  Typically, about 24 
firms quote in a UK motor insurance sub-market (see below), which on the supply side suggests 
a competitive market structure in which there is free entry and exit. The firms are better informed 
than consumers, who search, and since in practice firms offer insurance repeatedly and are able 
to learn the nature of their market, it is assumed that they have full information.  There is a single 
period and a sufficient number of firms, s = 1, 2, …, S, to cover the market, while each firm posts 
no more than a single price in each sub-market.
8
  In the knowledge of consumer search, the firms 
move first in posting their prices, and they are earn a net operating return Rjk from (j, k), which 
given free entry is constant across firms, although possibly differing across sub-markets. 
 
As regards the firms’ costs, these are primarily fixed in nature, comprising the actuarial costings, 
the setting-up of a website, software development, advertising, premises, non-variable staffing 
costs and so on.  It is supposed that each firm s has a fixed cost of Fs.  Given its market strategy, 
actuarial costings, fixed costs and net operating returns Rjk, a firm s may decide to opt-out of 
some markets, so that if it quotes for J
s
 . J individual and Ks . K car types its profits /s are: 
 
    / s ( R jk
j0J s ,k0K s
1 " Fs      (6) 
 
Firms may make super-normal profits overall, i.e. /s > 0, but competitive pressures mean each 
firm makes Rjk in each sub-market in which it quotes, so that it is unable to cross-subsidise its 
                                                 
7
 For the purpose of exposition, for the time being we revert to the discrete version of the price set p. 
8
 If individuals tend to search on firms, then a firm’s lowest price is likely to be discovered. In practice, a firm may 
quote a different price on a comparison than on its own website, but below we consider a single leading comparison 
site (and the websites of firms not quoting on this site), as we have insufficient resources to sample all such sites.  A 
firm may chose not to enter a sub-market, which is discussed below. 
 8
activities across sub-markets.  The equilibrium occurs where, in the knowledge of consumer 
search, firms post their prices at no more than a single price in each sub-market (j, k), but only 
offer that number of contracts in each sub-market to make a net return of Rjk, such that overall 
each firm that posts non-zero prices is able to make non-negative profits /s.  
 
Finally, the good under consideration is an insurance contract, so that the prices are premiums 
and in the event of an accident an individual makes a claim on the contract.  Within each sub-
market all contracts carry the same expected claim, but this will affect the price dispersion, as 
proportionately more of the lower-priced contracts must be sold in order to make a return of Rjk, 
so that as the risk increases fewer firms will be observed quoting lower prices.  In considering 
insurance it is assumed that the firms are risk neutral, so that Rjk now denotes the expected net 
operating return from sub-market (j, k), including the claim, and /s is the expected profit. 
 
2.3 Price Distribution with Insurance 
To model the price dispersion for the case of motor insurance, for sub-market (j, k), let qj (0 ! qj
< 1) denote the probability that an individual has an accident and let Ck (> 0) denote the claim 
amount in the event of an accident, where without real significance these are independent of one 
another.
9
  At a price or premium of prjk the expected revenue on a single contract is prjk - qj Ck (> 
0), and given the above assumptions the number of firms quoting at this price is: 
 
   X rjk #
(prjk " q jCk ) f (prjk " q jCk;m jk, p1 jk ) N jk
R jk
.  (7) 
 
                                                 
9
 Some cars attract higher risk drivers, but to the extent that this reflects average risk across individual types it is 
captured by C.  Likewise, some individual types j may have more severe accidents, but this is also reflected in C. 
These are without significance as q and C are always considered together, as a product.  Since insurance is a legal 
requirement and the level of coverage is kept constant the risk preferences of the individuals are not considered.  
Potentially, risk aversion could affect the propensity to search, but this is taken up below. 
 9
The price prjk supports at least one firm if and only if Xrjk + 1.  This can be seen by noting that the 
first term in the numerator of (7) is the expected revenue on a single contract at price prjk, the 
second term is the probability that prjk is searched as the lowest price and the final term is the 
market size Njk.
10
  The numerator therefore gives the expected total revenue that can be earned on 
contracts at a price prjk, and the denominator is return which can be earned by a single firm.  For 
values of Xrjk above unity more firms enter and supply the market at price prjk, so that letting prjk 
vary then (7) maps out the entire distribution of prices for (j, k). 
 
This situation is sketched in Figure 2 for a level of search m, letting the price vary continuously 
and dropping subscripts.  The SS schedule plots the relationship between aggregate demand and 
price as a result of search, Q ( f p " qC : m, p1& N'
'
                                                
, and the BB schedule is the break-even line, 
showing the levels of demand above which firms enter the market at each price.  Substituting the 
expression for Q into (7), setting X = 1 and rearranging gives (p - q C) Q = R, so that the BB is in 
fact a rectangular hyperbola.  The intersection of the SS and BB schedules in Figure 2 shows the 
minimum and maximum prices, pmin and pmax, and hence the price range.  Between these prices 
the vertical distance between the SS and BB schedules gives the number of firms at each price.  
This price distribution is plausible, as now both the high and low prices are unattractive.  
 
2.4 The Relationship between Price Dispersion and Search 
As search m increases, the SS schedule in Figure 2 shifts in the manner indicated by Figure 1, 
causing the minimum and maximum prices to fall and the mean price to fall also.  However, the 
effect on the variance of the prices cannot be discerned from Figure 2, so that it is examined 
algebraically.  Substituting for  in (7) from (4), with p replaced by p - q C, the 
distribution of prices for each sub-market is given by (p + p
& 1,: pmCqpf "
1 > q C): 
 
10
 To make search comparable across sub-markets qj Ck is deducted from the premium in f. 
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   h(p : m, qC, p1) (
( p" qC) m exp[m p1 " p" qC& '2 3] N
R
. (8) 
 
First of all, consider the standard good case, i.e. q = 0.  Then, in Appendix B it is shown that the 
mean of (8) is inversely related to search, confirming the diagrammatic analysis.  The variance is 
more difficult to sign, but setting the minimum price arbitrarily small, i.e. p1 = 0, then: 
 
   
4 var h p :m, 0, 0& '
4m
5 [6] 0 iff m 6 [5] 8
9
N
R
.  (9) 
 
As the search sample size m increases from unity, price dispersion at first increases but then falls.  
As intuition, when m = 1, so that all consumers sample a single price only, a single high-price is 
offered in the market as no firm has an incentive to offer less than this.
11
  However, as consumers 
begin to search, it is advantageous for some firms to offer lower prices to capture these and the 
variance increases, but as search continues the variance must eventually fall and it continues to 
do so.  Thus, for sufficiently high levels of search relative to the market size and net return, (9) 
tells us that the price dispersion decreases as the search intensity increases. 
 
With insurance, q > 0, and again setting the minimum price arbitrarily small, the variance of h(p: 
m, q C, 0) is derived in Appendix C as follows:
12
 
 var h(p : m, qC, 0) ( mean h(p : m, q C, 0) [A - mean h( p : m, qC, 0)],  (10) 
 
 
where  meanh(p : m, qC, 0) ( exp(mqC) (2 "mqC)
m2
N
R
,   (11) 
 
                                                 
11
 This is can be thought of as the monopoly price, although insurance is a legal requirement and in principle firms 
could charge a single price up and to where car ownership ceases to be worthwhile. 
12
 When q = 0 then (10) to (12) reduce to the expressions for the standard good case derived in Appendix B. 
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and    A # 6 " 2 mqC
m (2 "mqC) .     (12) 
 
For sufficiently high levels of risk q C, a negative relationship exists between the mean premium 
and q C in (11).  This is because the low-premium contracts carry the same expected claim, and 
so as the risk increases relatively more of these contracts must be offered to earn a net return of R, 
causing the mean premium to fall.  However, if 0 < m q C < 1 the mean premium is positively 
related to risk, and since this accords with intuition and Figure 2 (as q C increases the asymptote 
shifts to the right in this figure), this is assumed to hold.  In this case the mean premium in (11) is 
positive and there is negative relationship with the search intensity m, which is like before. 
 
As regards the variance, differentiating (10) with respect to m gives: 
 
4 var h(p : m, qC, 0)
4m
(
4meanh(p)
4m
A
2
" mean h( p)78
98:8
;8
<8=8
$ meanh(p) 4A
4m
. (13) 
 
To sign this, A is negatively related to m in (12), while in Appendix C it is shown that:
13
 
 
A
2
6 meanh p : m, qC, 0& ' if m 6
2exp 2" 2& '
1$ 2
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
N
R
>
3
2
N
R
. (14) 
 
From this it follows that the variance of the price distribution is negatively related to search m 
when (14) is satisfied, but that otherwise it can be positive.  The term in square brackets is 
approximately equal to 1.5, so that it is a stronger condition than that for standard good in (10), 
but it is sufficient only and it reflects the effect of risk.   Of interest is that it points in the same 
direction as the standard good case, such that an increase in search leads a reduction in price 
dispersion providing search is sufficiently strong.  Since A is increasing in q C it can be shown 
that (14) is a sufficient condition for the variance to increase with risk, but at a decreasing rate. 
                                                 
13
 A is decreasing in m when mqC53" 3, which is satisfied since 0 < m q C < 1. 
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 3. The Data 
 
The data were collected at monthly intervals over the one-year period, February 2006 to January 
2007, from confused.com, the UK’s leading motor insurance comparison website.  This site was 
launched in 2003, and at 2007 it claimed to cover 94% of the firms in this market, when it had a 
two-thirds share of motor insurance policies sold via an online aggregator (Financial Times, 
2007).
14
  A firm is a distinct maker of quotes, where there are three principal methods of selling 
motor insurance, each of which is represented on confused.com.
15
  The data were collected by 
taking-on assumed identities in relation to personal characteristics, car type and location.  The 
confused.com site is advantageous in this respect, as it allows search to be made at a fine level 
and it easily accommodates repeated search. The confused.com website listed six companies as 
not quoting on its site, and data were collected directly on a similar basis from the websites of 
four of these, Churchill, Direct Line, Esure and Tesco, each with a large market share.  It is 
reasonable that consumers wishing to sample further prices will go to these sites. 
 
3.1 The Customer, Car and Policy Characteristics 
In relation to personal characteristics, these were chosen to reflect different search abilities, and 
allowed to vary by age, occupation and sex.  It is hypothesised that age lowers search ability, and 
four ages were chosen, 25, 40, 55 and 70-years (see Table 1), which cover a good age spread, 
with fewer firms quoting outside this range.  Since search may vary by occupation, we chose 
blue and white-collar occupations of a ‘factory worker’ and ‘computer consultant’, where it is 
                                                 
14
 Confused.com is part of the Admiral Group, which also competes as a direct insurance provider, but no evidence 
of bias was found. It may be possible to infer search behaviour from the underlying programmed software, but these 
are commercially highly sensitive, while direct approaches to confused.com and its parent were unanswered. 
Preliminary investigation extended to consider other comparison sites, such as moneysupermarket.com, while more 
recently other sites have been launched, such as gocompare.com and comparethemarket.com. 
15
 An underwriter may sell insurance direct to the consumer, through an exclusive relationship with a firm or firms 
(e.g. a branded product or products), or through a broker that deals with a range of underwriters. 
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expected that the latter is more skilled at search.
16
 We also include an ‘unemployed individual’, 
who on average is likely to be less skilled at search, and a ‘retired person’, which may embody 
fairly heterogeneous individuals, including the inactive and so-called ‘silver-surfers’.  Finally, 
data were also collected for males and females, giving a total of 22 consumer types.
17
   
 
The main UK motor industry body, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, defines 
nine car market segments, and the car types were chosen for the leading model in five of these 
segments, based on total UK sales in the year 2000.  These are the Ford Fiesta Encore (13.3% of 
sales in the Super-mini car segment in the year 2000), the Ford Focus Zetec (17.3% of the Lower 
Medium segment), the Vauxhall Vectra CD 16V (14.3% of Upper Medium cars), the BMW 525i 
(12.9% of Executive cars) and the MG MGF (8.6% of Sports cars).
18
  Each model was assumed 
to be six years old, which is the median UK car age (SMMT, 2006).  Details of the car types are 
given in Table 2, which shows the car values (at 2006), the total sales (at 2000) and a risk index. 
The BMW is the highest risk car, while the Fiesta and Focus are relatively low risk.   
 
The other factor that could be varied is the geographical location of the car owner.  Preliminary 
work suggests motor insurance quotes can vary substantially, even from street to street, so that it 
was decided to choose a single address.  This is for the Gosforth postcode district (NE3 2), which 
is a reasonably affluent suburb of Newcastle upon Tyne, and which has a mean house price close 
to the national pattern by four house types (i.e. flats, terraces, semi-detached and detached).  To 
select a street in this district, 40 postcodes were randomly sampled, and a postcode chosen with a 
                                                 
16
 The four insurers not quoting on confused.com did not permit search at this level, so that for these ‘manual’ or 
‘manufacturing and engineering’ and ‘professional’ or ‘scientific and technical’ were used instead. 
17
 For realism, 70-year olds are retirees only, while the retired may also be 55-years of age.  
18
 The other segments are the Mini and Luxury vehicles, which are relatively small markets, and the Multi-Purpose 
and Dual Purpose vehicles (i.e. Sports Utility vehicles), but which are similar to the Upper Medium segment. 
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standard deviation of quoted prices across firms closest to the mean deviation.
19
  Supplementary 
price quote data were collected for four other locations for a single month to test the sensitivity 
of the results.   These are for contrasting areas in the same region – one urban (Byker) and one 
rural (Hexham) – and two areas in the south of England that are comparable to Gosforth in their 
house prices and stock; the Woodley area of Reading and the Fishponds district of Bristol. 
 
As many as possible of the other motor insurance policy details were held constant, and selected 
to reflect average market conditions.  These are a fully comprehensive level of cover, an annual 
mileage of 9,000 miles and business, commuting and social use.  All drivers have a 5-years no-
claim bonus.  Some other features were set to zero, including no-claims bonus protection and 
legal fees cover.  Few firms include the latter as standard, although many include a courtesy car, 
which was therefore requested.  Consumers may vary the voluntary excess amount, which is the 
owner’s liability in the event of a claim, but this was set to zero.  Policies may also include a 
compulsory excess, and the data were collected for the lowest quoted premium and associated 
excess.
20
  Policies may vary in other details that cannot be controlled by the consumer, such as 
windscreen or audio equipment cover, but these are generally minor and confined to the small 
print, so that for practical purposes the policies are taken to be homogeneous. 
 
3.2 Data Description
Data were gathered for 22 individual and 5 car types over a twelve-month period, giving a total 
of 1,320 price sets.  Each price set comprises data on price quotes collected from confused.com 
and four directly-searched insurers, giving a total of 32,255 observations on prices.  The mean 
number of firms quoting in a price set is 24.4, and there is little variation in this by individual or 
                                                 
19
 This is Kirkley Close (NE3 2LJ).  The procedure reflected the interest in price dispersion.  Twenty-five firms 
offered prices for some or all of the 40 sampled postcodes, of which 13 offered the same price at each location. Of 
the remainder, the greatest standard deviation across 40 locations for any firm was 14.7% of the mean premium.  
20
 Prior to July 2006 confused.com sometimes reported multiple quotes for a single firm with different premium and 
compulsory excess combinations, but after then it quoted the lowest premium only. 
 15
car type.
21
  The total number of firms in the dataset is 41, but entry and exit means the number 
quoting in each month is between 31 and 36, of which 27 quote in every month. 
 
The mean and coefficient of variation of the premiums for each individual and car type is shown 
in Table 3.  These are calculated across price sets for the twelve months.  As would be expected, 
the mean premium increases with the risk index of the car types shown in Table 2, but given this 
there is a consistent pattern for the mean premium by the individual type.  The mean premium 
decreases with age (except that 70-year olds pay a higher premium than 55-year olds), decreases 
with the occupation as we move down the table, and is higher for males.  These reflect individual 
risk characteristics, so that higher premiums are generally paid by those that either have higher 
accident rates or more severe accidents, e.g. a 25 year-old male.
22
  The individual and car types 
may also signal information about income and the propensity to search, and we take-up this point 
below.
23
  As regards the coefficient of variation, several patterns are evident that appear to reflect 
both risk and search factors, and it is the latter that forms the basis for our empirical work. 
 
Table 4 gives information on the compulsory excess, and shows that an excess is required in at 
least 80% of cases, being virtually always requested for the BMW and MGF cars.  The excess 
amount is greatest for these two cars, although relative to the premium it is smaller than that for 
the Fiesta or Focus.  Compared to these last two, an excess is more likely to be required for the 
Vectra, reflecting its risk status in Table 2, although the mean excess is smaller.  The excess 
amount was not ascertained in about 10% of cases (Table 3), so that these are predicted.
24
  This 
                                                 
21
 For the car types these range between 23.6 and 26.0, although 19.7 for the MGF. The minimum number of firms 
is between 11 and 19, and 30 and 31 for the maximum, although 11 and 25 firms respectively for the MGF. 
22
 The car type also signals information about the kinds of individual that drive that car, e.g. MGF drivers are likely 
to be riskier prospects than those driving family vehicles. To the extent that this does not vary according to the 
individual characteristics of age, occupation or sex, then it is reflected in the premium for the car type. 
23
 In the context of the model, a higher propensity to search means that a larger fixed sample m is chosen. 
24
 The excess amount could be ascertained by following the web-link through to the insurer’s own website, but 
resource considerations prohibited this, so that these are estimated.  The subsequent regressions were run both with 
and without the cases involving the predicted excesses, but making no qualitative difference to the results. 
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is based on the following regression of the excess amount (EXCESS) on the premium (PREM) 
with car and firm dummies (there is little variation in the excess amount by individual type).  
 
EXCESS  =  227.1 - 0.06 PREM – 4.5 FOCUS + 25.0 VECTRA + 102.8 BMW + 87.1 MGF     (15) 
       (141.1)  (17.7)       (5.1)       (26.1)           (82.3)         (65.9) 
 
 R
2
 = 0.68, n = 29,055, robust standard errors, t-ratios in parentheses, includes firm dummies. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
The model is estimated using the data for the 1,320 price sets, where price dispersion for each 
price set is measured by the coefficient of variation of the premiums in that price set (CVPREM).  
The basic relationship is linearised, so that the estimating equation is of the form: 
 
CVPREMjkt  =  ? - @1 mjk + @2 Njk - @3 Rjk + @4 RISKjk + Month dummiest + Ajkt (16)
 
where m, N and R measure the ability to search, market size and net return respectively.  To these 
we add variables to capture risk, monthly dummies and an error term A.  It is estimated with 
monthly data for the sub-markets (j, k), i.e. 22 individual types and 5 car types.  Natural logs are 
taken of the premium and excess data.  The variables used to measure each of the m, N, R and 
RISK are now considered, where we expect the @’s in (16) to be positively signed. 
 
4.1 The Variables
To measure the ability to search m, we include binary variables for the individual characteristics, 
age (AGE), occupation (OCC) and sex (SEX).  As well as ability, consumers may also differ in 
their propensity to search, which depends on economic factors.  Table 2 shows that the cars have 
different market values and are likely to be associated with different income groups, while Table 
3 shows that individual types face different premiums.  Search ability reflects innate personal 
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characteristics and is independent of the car type, so to pick-up differences in search propensity 
dummy variables are included for the car type (CAR) and for the car type interacted with the 
individual characteristics.  The interaction terms were almost uniformly insignificant, and so are 
not included or reported below.  This suggests that the CAR dummies alone are able to pick-up 
the differences in the propensity to search between sub-markets.
25
   
 
Estimation also requires knowledge of the market size N, which is shown in Table 2.  However, 
this cannot be included along with the CAR dummies, so that for this reason the regressions are 
separately run for each car type, while recognising that when it is estimated across all types the 
CAR terms may also capture the effect of market size.  We have no data for the size of each sub-
market, while it is not possible to separately dummy this out.  However, the above interaction 
terms between the car types and individual characteristics suggest that this is not an issue.  
 
As regards the net return R, it is reasonable that this is the constant across sub-markets due to 
competitive pressures, but given this there may be differences in the price dispersion between 
price sets due to the behaviour of particular firms.  First, if a firm quotes in many sub-markets 
then its break-even position within any one market will be lower, causing more firms to quote at 
that price (i.e. the line BB shifts upwards in Figure 2).  To capture this, terms are included for the 
total number of firms opting-out of each price set according to individual (OPTOUTI) and car 
type (OPTOUTC).  These cannot be signed a priori as the effect on the variance depends on 
where in the price distribution the firms offer their prices.  Second, differences in the firms’ fixed 
costs in (6) may have similar effect on the break-even position, and so firm dummies (FIRM) are 
included for this.  Third, as the number of firms (NUMBER) increases in a price set then the 
                                                 
25
 The firms do not observe information on individual incomes, and it may be that the car type signals differences in 
the propensity to search, while the differences in individual characteristics pick-up the differences in risk, for which 
RISK variables are included below.  The interaction terms between the car types and individual characteristics were 
significant for the MGF car, but they pick-up the effect of the car opt-out that is included below. 
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extremes of the price distribution may be made even more relatively unattractive, which suggests 
a negative effect on price dispersion. 
 
Finally, the model predicts that price dispersion increases at a decreasing rate with risk, i.e. q C 
in (10).  Since riskier sub-markets are characterised by higher premiums (Table 3), we measure 
RISK using the mean premium (MPREM), including a quadratic term for this.  Since the firm’s 
risk decreases as the excess (EXCESS) increases, then this term is also included. 
 
4.2 The Results
The results from estimating (16) using OLS are reported in Table 5, both overall and for the five 
car types.  The base case is a 25-year old, unemployed male, who in the equation for all car types 
drives a Ford Fiesta car.  The model provides a good fit to the data, especially for some car types, 
and in the case of all car types virtually all the coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  Before 
discussing the ability to search terms, we consider the other estimates in this table. 
 
4.2.1 The Control terms (n, R and RISK)
The estimates on the CAR terms suggest that the car types with higher premiums face less price 
dispersion, and this is consistent with the propensity to search explanation.  Of course, the CAR 
terms may also capture the effect of market size, and the estimates could also be interpreted as 
supporting this, although the propensity to search explanation seems more plausible.  If in place 
of the CAR terms a single variable is included for the market size (according to the sales data in 
Table 2) then this is significant and correctly signed.  As regards the firm dummies, up to 8 of 
the 40 these terms is significant (not reported), while in the regression for all car types the opt-
outs are also significant.  These suggest when firms drop-out of a car market (OPTOUTC) the 
remaining firms are more likely to quote at the extremes of the price distribution, suggesting they 
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are specialised in particular models, but when they drop-out from quoting for specific individuals 
(OPTOUTI) they tend do so for premiums at the extremes.  Finally, as expected, the more firms 
that quote (NUMBER) in a sub-market the smaller is the price dispersion. 
 
The coefficients on the mean premium (MPREM) terms suggest that price dispersion increases 
with the risk of each car type, albeit at a decreasing rate, which is significant for four out of the 
five cars.
26
  When estimated across all car types in the first column of Table 5 it was necessary to 
include slope dummy variables on the mean premium for each car type.  The coefficients on the 
combined MPREM terms suggest that the relationship between price dispersion and risk shifts 
upwards for more risky cars, and it accords well with the pattern shown in Table 2.  Finally, the 
coefficient on EXCESS is generally negative and significant, again as expected. 
 
4.2.2 The Ability to Search terms (m) 
The AGE, OCC and SEX terms capture the ability to search.  In the case of age, the estimate for 
all cars suggests that price dispersion increases with age at the 1% level, both between the 25-
year and 40-year olds, and between the 40-year and 55-year olds, suggesting that search ability 
has a strong effect on price dispersion.  There is no significant different in dispersion between 
the 55-year and 70 year olds, but it could be that the number of 70-year olds using the Internet to 
purchase motor insurance is relatively small, so that for practical purposes the firms treat them 
the same as 55-year olds.  If each car type is considered in Table 5 then there is a remarkably 
similar pattern in the relative magnitude of the coefficients for the 40, 55 and 70-year olds, with 
the 40-year olds always facing less price dispersion.  In the case of the 25-year olds the pattern is 
maintained for the Fiesta and Focus cars, but there is much greater price dispersion for the other 
three car types.  These are the higher-risk cars shown Table 2, and it seems that we are unable to 
                                                 
26
 Evaluating the terms on MPREM and MPREM2 using the values for the mean premium in Table 3 suggests that 
the overall effect is positive in each case, except for the MGF where a negative value is found.  However, the model 
suggests a negative relationship is possible for sufficiently high levels of risk.   
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control for the greater risk associated with the 25-year olds driving these cars, which is despite a 
5-years no-claim bonus being stipulated.
27
  Nevertheless, overall, these results suggest that price 
dispersion is positively related to age, and so inversely related to ability. 
 
For the occupation variables, the results for all cars show that price dispersion is significantly 
greater for the unemployed than for all other occupations, while the retired have significantly 
greater price dispersion than for the factory worker and computer consultant, each at the 1% 
level.   The computer consultant also faces less price dispersion than the factory worker, which is 
significant at the 1% level for three of the car types.  Of course, the term for the unemployed 
could be picking-up greater risk, but for several reasons we do not believe this to be so.
28
  
Overall, these results tend to support the hypothesis that ‘occupations’ associated with higher 
abilities to search face lower price dispersion.  This is an important result, as unlike age (and the 
25-year olds in particular), risk is clearly much less of a consideration here. 
 
Finally, in the case of SEX, Table 5 shows that its effect on price dispersion is dependent on the 
car type.  For three of the car types this variable is insignificant, but significant at the 1% level 
for the Fiesta and Focus, although varying in sign.  An explanation for this may be that female 
drivers of these cars differ in their search behaviour, as the Fiesta car is a small functional car 
whereas the Focus is a family car.  It is therefore possible that the Focus will tend be driven by 
‘cost-conscious mothers’, which means it is picking-up a difference in the search propensity.  
Generally, there appears to be little difference in price dispersion between males and females, 
although Table 1 suggests that Internet usage is also not very different between these. 
                                                 
27
 Unfortunately, for these cars there are no more variables available to control for the additional element of risk 
associated with 25 year-olds, which the MPREM terms seem unable to wholly capture. 
28
 Potentially, this could be part of the story for the MGF car, where the unemployed face substantially greater price 
dispersion, but the pattern of estimates is broadly similar elsewhere.  In addition, the minimum premium of each 
price set was regressed on the consumer characteristics (with car dummies) and no significant difference was found 
between occupation types, including the unemployed, whereas that for the 25-year olds was significant and positive. 
 21
4.3 Robustness of the Results 
Overall, these results suggest that lower levels of price dispersion are faced by those individuals 
who we expect to have higher search abilities, i.e. the younger and the higher-skilled employed.  
It remains to consider the robustness of the results.  Broadly, the sensitivity of the results is 
examined in relation to three aspects, and these are the measure of price dispersion, the measure 
of the price and the choice of driver location.  Direct estimation of (8) is also undertaken using 
maximum likelihood techniques.  The results of these robustness tests are given in Table 6. 
 
First, instead of the coefficient of variation, (16) was estimated with the price range between the 
maximum and minimum (logged) premiums of each price set taken as the dependent variable.  
The results in Column 1 of Table 6 can be compared with that for all car types in Table 5.  While 
there are some minor differences (e.g. the SEX term is now insignificant and price dispersion is 
now the same between the Focus and Fiesta cars), they exhibit a remarkably similar pattern in 
the sign, significance and relative magnitude of the coefficients, suggesting that the conclusions 
regarding the ability to search are unchanged.  Equation (16) was also re-estimated using the 
‘gap’ measure of price dispersion, i.e. the difference between the two lowest prices in a price set 
(see Baye et al, 2004), but the results (not shown) were poor, with a low goodness of fit and 
many insignificant or wrongly-signed variables.  Underlying the gap measure is the Bertrand 
paradigm, in which some consumers have full information and purchase at the lowest price, but 
this sits uneasily with the motor insurance market in which not all firms quote on the comparison 
site, while the gap measure captures only a small part of the total price dispersion. 
 
The price data are for the lowest quoted premium, but there is a compulsory excess in about 90% 
of cases (Table 4), and the regression in (15) shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the excess and premium.  As a second exercise (16) was re-estimated but with the premium data 
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adjusted for the excess.  Broadly, this involved finding the certainty equivalent premium for each 
premium-excess combination, assuming consumers have a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function and letting the risk parameter and consumer income take plausible values (see Appendix 
D).  Qualitatively similar results were obtained for each parameterisation, so that a representative 
estimation is reported in Column 2 of Table 6, but again it supports the basic findings. 
 
Third, motor insurance quotes can vary geographically, so that to test the sensitivity of the results 
data were collected for the Ford Focus car for four other locations for a single month towards the 
middle of the sample period (see above).  The regression for the Focus car in Table 5 was re-
estimated but including the additional observations and intercept dummies for each location. The 
result in Column 3 of Table 6 again suggests little change.  When slope dummies were placed on 
the search terms for the Reading and Bristol locations these were not significant at the 10% level, 
either as a group or for the three AGE and OCC terms considered separately.  These areas were 
chosen on the basis of similar house prices and stock, but two other areas were chosen because of 
their contrasting nature, and here significant differences were found for the slope dummies at the 
5% level.  In the case of Hexham, which is a prosperous, rural satellite of Newcastle, the results 
suggest that the unemployed face less price dispersion, but this supports the Internet-use story as 
these are likely to be better educated.
29
  In the case of Byker, which is a deprived urban area, the 
difference arises because of the 25-year-olds, but again this suggests that the estimation is unable 
to completely control for the greater risk associated with these individuals. 
 
Finally, the expression for the distribution of prices in (8) was estimated directly using maximum 
likelihood techniques.  This is potentially advantageous, as it enables the model structure to be 
imposed on the data.  Again, Appendix D sets out the estimating approach, and the results for all 
                                                 
29
 The positive coefficient on the intercept dummy for Hexham is consistent with this, and it arises because the 
unemployed form the base case, and a similar explanation follows for Byker below. 
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car types is shown in Column 4 of Table 6 using the data for all 32,255 observations.  In this case 
m increases with search, which is inversely related to the variance in (8), so that we expect larger 
estimated coefficients for those with greater search ability.  While there is now no significant 
difference between the 25 and 40-year olds, the results are supportive of those obtained using the 
coefficient of variation, while they also offer good support for the model. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper analyses the relationship between price dispersion and the ability to search using a 
non-sequential search model, which is estimated using data for the UK Internet motor insurance 
market.  The model shows that there is a negative relationship between search ability and price 
dispersion, which is invariant to insurance risk.  It is argued that the ability to search depends on 
Internet usage, which in turn is related to individual characteristics.  The paper uses data on 
1,320 price sets, involving 32,255 observations on prices and consumer characteristics, from data 
that was gathered from motor insurance websites for 22 consumer and five car types. 
 
The results provide evidence of a direct link between price dispersion and ability to search.  We 
find that younger consumers, who use the Internet more frequently, typically face lower price 
dispersion, while the unemployed, who are expected to have weaker search skills, face 
significantly greater price dispersion.  Individuals in the highest-skilled occupation of computer 
consultant also face lower price dispersion.  There is generally no difference between males and 
females, although their Internet usage does not vary greatly.  Overall, the paper finds that price 
dispersion is lower for those consumer types with greater Internet usage, suggesting that price 
dispersion is inversely related to the ability to search. 
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Potentially, there could be other interpretations of the results.  One of these could be that greater 
price dispersion arises from poorer Internet access, although for this to occur online and offline 
prices would have to be identical, but we do not believe this to be the case.  Further, greater risk 
could lead to greater price dispersion, but our results are not consistent with this explanation, and 
they are obtained for the low-risk cars where this does seem an issue.  Thus, we believe we have 
good evidence of a negative relationship between the ability to search and price dispersion. It is 
plausible that this behaviour will be observed in other markets, while the policy implication is 
that in order to increase consumer welfare it may not be sufficient just to get people online. 
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Table 1: Frequency of Internet Use by Age and Sex 
 
 
 
Daily Weekly 
Less 
frequently 
     
16-24 years 77 19 4 
25-44 72 20 8 
45-64 65 25 10 
Age: 
65 plus 54 27 19 
     
Sex: Male 73 20 7 
 Female 65 24 11 
Source: Office of National Statistics, 2008.    
Notes: Internet use within previous three months.  Usage data not available by occupation. 
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Table 2: Car Types 
 
Make and model Engine size (cc) Car value
1
Total sales
2
Risk rating
3
     
Ford Fiesta Encore 1299 £1,595 91,783 4 
Ford Focus Zetec 1596 £3,350 114,512 5 
Vauxhall Vectra CD 16V 1998 £3,120 70,704 12 
BMW 525i 2494 £8,065 13,443 16 
MG MGF 1796 £4,320 5,766 12 
Notes.  1. parkers.co.uk, 6th February 2006.  2. Sales at 2000, SMMT (2006).  3. Advisory risk rating index of the 
Association of British Insurers, based on damage and parts costs, repair times, new car values, body shells, 
performance and security.  The index lies between 1 and 20, where 1 is the lowest risk. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Premium by Car and Individual Type 
 
Car type:  Fiesta Focus Vectra BMW MGF 
       
       
Age 25 years 373 389 570 905 692 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.25) 
 40 years 269 281 403 526 465 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.22) 
 55 years 212 223 306 400 371 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.28) 
 70 years 223  232  325  414  384  
  (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) 
       
       
Occupation Unemployed 299 316 455 653 577 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.42) 
 Factory 281 293 417 600 486 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
 Consultant 276 286 410 581 473 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) 
 Retired 215 225 312 402 371 
  (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.24) 
       
       
Sex Male 278 290 412 584 495 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.25) 
 Female 267 280 400 562 448 
  (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) 
       
       
All individuals 273 285 406 573 486 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25) 
Notes. Mean premiums in £’s, rounded to nearest £, and coefficient of variation in parentheses.  Each of these 
calculated as the mean across the relevant price sets.  Excludes compulsory excesses. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Compulsory Excess 
 
Car type Excess 
required 
(%) 
Mean excess 
amount  
(£) 
CV of 
excess 
amount 
Ratio of 
excess to 
premium 
Amount not 
known  
(%) 
      
Fiesta 80.9 159.0 0.47 0.58 13.4 
Focus 81.3 152.8 0.46 0.54 15.7 
Vectra 95.6 141.9 0.56 0.35 10.8 
BMW 98.9 202.6 0.47 0.35 9.9 
MGF 98.9 182.8 0.47 0.38 5.1 
Notes. Final column shows % of cases in first column where excess amount is not known.  
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Table 5: Regression Results for Coefficient of Variation 
 
Dep. vble: CVPREM All cars Fiesta Focus Vectra BMW  MGF 
Constant -704.19*** -87.56 -920.27*** -628.18*** -832.66*** -461.95***
       
AGE: 40 11.94*** 8.51*** 9.80*** -0.60 -8.07*** -11.62*** 
AGE: 55 25.52*** 14.91*** 20.49*** 5.77* 0.19 -7.66** 
AGE: 70 25.74*** 13.75*** 18.95*** 5.33 1.29 -3.55 
OCC: Factory -12.35*** -0.65 -4.51** -3.51* -5.90** -21.03*** 
OCC: Computer -12.66*** -1.43 -4.51** -3.74** -7.09*** -22.14*** 
OCC: Retired -10.17*** 1.59 -2.60 -0.92 -5.55** -18.29*** 
SEX: Female -1.06* 2.73*** -1.46*** -0.32 -0.21 -0.57 
       
CAR: Focus -27.01*** - - - - - 
CAR: Vectra -154.86*** - - - - - 
CAR: BMW  -280.15*** - - - - - 
CAR: MGF -237.17*** - - - - - 
       
OPTOUTC 2.51*** - - - - - 
OPTOUTI -2.85*** -0.11 -1.48** -0.53 -1.71** 0.18 
NUMBER -0.51*** -0.18* -0.28** -0.30** -0.17 -0.90*** 
       
MPREM 254.49*** 27.71 322.39*** 215.35*** 278.74*** 174.29*** 
MPREM
2
-20.95*** -1.20 -26.62*** -17.39*** -21.27*** -15.19*** 
 
      
MPREM * Focus 4.29*** - - - - - 
MPREM * Vectra 24.74*** - - - - - 
MPREM * BMW5 43.30*** - - - - - 
MPREM * MGF 34.97*** - - - - - 
      
EXCESS -5.85*** -2.10 -4.21** -1.37 -7.54*** 4.48* 
       
FIRM dummies included included included included included included 
       
MONTH dummies included included included included included included 
       
F 106.25 332.03*** 137.96*** 47.55*** 87.06 294.49*** 
R
2
0.726 0.920 0.909 0.765 0.865 0.954 
Observations 1,313 263 263 263 262 262 
Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors across price sets. * significant at 10% level. ** = 5% and *** = 1% level.  
Natural logarithms are taken of the premium and excess. 
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Table 6: Robustness of the Results 
 
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 report OLS results with robust standard errors.  Column 1 uses the premium range as the 
dependent variable and Columns 2 and 3 use the coefficient of variation, where Column 2 adjusts the premium 
for the excess assuming ? = 0.5 and wo = £20,000 (see Appendix D), and Column 3 is regressed for the Focus 
car only but including an extra 66 observations for each of four locations.  Column 4 regresses the model using 
maximum likelihood techniques, where the opposite signs are expected on AGE, OCC and SEX.  Logs are taken 
of the premium and excess. * significant at 10% level. ** = 5% and *** = 1% level. 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4  
Constant -479.39*** -1,089.08*** -166.80*** 94.97*** 
     
AGE: 40 8.36*** 14.25*** 9.72** -2.07 
AGE: 55 17.69*** 31.67*** 18.89*** -10.97*** 
AGE: 70 17.53*** 31.23*** 20.16*** -9.81*** 
OCC: Factory -7.85*** -10.20*** -5.10 6.11*** 
OCC: Computer -7.95*** -10.35*** -5.18 6.80*** 
OCC: Retired -6.86*** -7.58*** -4.41 5.88*** 
SEX: Female 0.40 -1.46*** -2.13* -0.73 
     
CAR: Focus -4.12 -32.31*** - 2.26* 
CAR: Vectra -81.05*** -171.82*** - 0.54 
CAR: BMW  -118.90*** -329.96*** - 7.17*** 
CAR: MGF -142.70*** -267.71*** - 60.73** 
     
OPTOUTC 1.99*** 1.99** - -7.87*** 
OPTOUTI -1.91*** -2.43*** -2.42** - 
NUMBER -0.14*** -0.56*** 0.01 -0.28 
     
MPREM 164.38*** 357.25*** 68.58* - 
MPREM
2
-13.11*** -28.25*** -4.84 - 
 
    
MPREM * Focus 0.46 5.26*** - - 
MPREM * Vectra 12.46*** 27.03*** - - 
MPREM * BMW5 29.65*** 49.78*** - - 
MPREM * MGF 25.21*** 39.24*** - - 
    
EXCESS -2.86*** - -7.08** 0.03*** 
    
LOC: Byker - - -2.64 - 
LOC: Hexham - - 6.20** - 
LOC: Reading - - 2.03 - 
LOC: Bristol - - 1.84 - 
     
FIRM dummies included included included included 
     
MONTH dummies included included included included 
     
F [B2] 80.91*** 74.85*** 37.41*** [934.6***] 
R
2
 [logL] 0.684 0.696 0.444 [-32,570] 
Observations 1,313 1,313 527 32,255 
 31
Figure 1: Probability Density Functions for Lowest Searched Price 
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Figure 2: The Observed Price Distribution 
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Appendix A: The Mean and Variance of f(p: m, p1) = m exp {m (p1 - p)} 
The moment-generating function M(t) of f p: m, p1& '(m exp m p1 " p& '2 3 is given by the definite 
integral, where t < m: 
 
M(t) ( mexp m p1 $ t"m& 'p2 3dpp( p1
p(,
- (
mexp m p1 $ t"m& 'p2 3
t"m
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
p( p1
p(,
.  (A1) 
 
The solution to this is: 
    M(t) ( "mexp t p1& '
t"m
.     (A2) 
 
When t = 0, then M(0) = 1, so that f p :m, p1& '- dp (1.  Further, differentiating (A2) gives: 
 
C8M (t) ( m 1" t"m& 'p1) * exp t p1& '
t " m& '2
,  and  
 
C8C8M (t) (
"m 2 1" t"m& 'p12 3$ t"m& '
2 p1
2) *exp t p1& '
t"m& '3
 . 
 
Evaluating these at t = 0, the mean of f p :m, p1& ' is: 
 
    C8M (0) ( p1 $
1
m
, 
 
and the variance of  is: f p :m, p1& '
 
    C8C8M (0) " C8M (0)2 ( 1
m2
. 
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Appendix B: The Variance of h(p: m, 0, p1) 
 
From equation (8), with q = 0, we have: 
 
  h(p : m, 0, p1) ( p m exp m p1 " p& '2 3
N
R
, p + p1& .'    
 
This has a moment-generating function (t < m): 
 
  M(t) ( p m exp m p1 $ t"m& 'p2 3
N
R
dp
p( p1
p(,
- .   (B1) 
 
To solve this, differentiate (a p $ b) exp m p1 $ t"m& 'p2 3
N
R
 with respect to p to get: 
 
  a $ b(t "m) $ a(t "m) p2 3exp m p1 $ (t "m) p2 3
N
R
.
 
 
Comparison with (B1) suggests a $ b(t "m) ( 0  and a t"m& 'p ( p m , so that: 
 
  M(t) ( N
R
pm
(t "m) "
m
(t "m)2
D8
E8
F8
G8
H8
I8
exp m p1 $ t"m& 'p2 3
78
98
:8
;8
<8
=8
p( p1
p(,
.
 
 
Since t < m, this can be evaluated as: 
 
  M t& '( exp t p1& '
m " m t"m& 'p1
t"m& '2
D8
E8
J8
F8J8
G8
H8
J8
I8J8
N
R
.  
 
The first and second derivatives are: 
  C8M t& '( " m exp t p1& '
z "12 32 $ 1
t"m& '3
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
N
R
, and  
  C8C8M t& '( "mexp t p1& '
z3 " 3z2 $ 6 z " 6
t"m& '4
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
N
R
, where z # p1 t"m& '.  
This means: 
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meanh p :m, 0, p1& '( C8M 0& '(
1" z& '2 $ 1
m2
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
N
R
, and    (B2) 
var h p :m, 0, p1& '( C8C8M 0& '" C8M 0& '
2
(
z3 $ 3z2 $ 6 z $ 6
m3
78
98
:8
;8
<8
=8
N
R
"
z2 " 2 z $ 2
m2
78
98
:8
;8
<8
=8
2
N
R
K8
L8
M8
N8
O8
P8
2
,     (B3) 
 
where z is now equal to -m p1 < 0.  By (B2), the mean is inversely related to search m, but in the 
case of the variance the relationship with search is ambiguous.  To simplify, set the minimum 
price p1 equal to zero, i.e. z = 0, in which case (B3) and (B2) can be written as: 
 
  var h p :m, 0, 0& ' ( meanh p :m, 0, 0& ' 3
m
"mean h p :m, 0, 0& '
78
98:8
;8
<8=8
. (B4) 
where  meanh p :m, 0, 0& '( 2
m2
N
R
.      (B5) 
 
Substituting (B5) into (B4) and differentiating gives: 
 
   
4 var h p :m, 0, 0& '
4m
5 (6) 0 iff m 6 (5) 8
9
N
R
.  (B6) 
Since var h > 0, then mean h < 3 / m in (B4), which using (B5) gives m > (2 / 3) (N / R), and this 
is consistent with (B6).  
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Appendix C: The Model including Risk (q > 0) 
From (8) we get (p > q C): 
 
  h(p : m, qC, 0) ( (p " qC) mexp "m( p" qC)2 3N
R
.   
 
The moment-generating function is: 
 
  M(t) ( p" qC& 'mexp (t "m)p$ mqC2 3N
R
dp.
p( 0
p(,
-  
 
To solve this, we proceed in the same way as Appendix B, to get: 
 
  M(t) ( m exp(mqC) (t "m)qC $1(t "m)2
D8
E8
F8
G8
H8
I8
N
R
. 
 
The first and second derivatives are: 
 
  C8M (t) ( "m exp(mqC) (t "m)q $ 2(t "m)3
D8
E8
F8
G8
H8
I8
N
R
and 
  M"(t) ( m exp(mqC) 2(t "m)qC $ 6(t "m)4
D8
E8
F8
G8
H8
I8
N
R
. 
 
The mean of , which is equal toh p : m, qC, 0& ' C8M 0& ', is therefore: 
 
  meanh(p : m, qC, 0) ( exp(mqC) (2 "mqC)
m
2
N
R
.   (C1) 
 
Further, since C8C8M 0& '( A C8M 0& ', where: 
 
   A # 6 " 2 mqC
m (2 "mqC) ,      (C2) 
 
then the variance, which is equal to C8C8M 0& '" C8M 0& '2, is: 
 
 var h(p : m, qC, 0) ( mean h(p : m, q C, 0) [A "mean h(p : m, qC, 0)]. (C3) 
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Differentiating the variance in (C3) with respect to the mean gives: 
 
4 var h( p;m)
4mean h(p;m) ( A " 2 mean h(p;m), 
 
and using (C1) and (C2) to substitute into the right-hand side of this, it is positive if and only if: 
 
   
N
R
5
m 3"mqC& '
2"mqC& '2 exp mqC& '
.    (C4) 
 
Let D denote the right-hand side of (C4) and write X # m q C, then: 
 
4D
4X
(
"m 2"X& '2 exp X " m 3"X& ' "2 2"X& 'exp X $ 2"X& '2 exp X2 3
2"X& '4 exp X& '2
. (C5) 
 
The right-hand side numerator of (C5) has roots X = 2 - Q2, 2 and 2 + Q2, but only the first is in 
the admissible range, 0 < X < 1, which gives a minimum.  Thus, a sufficient condition for (C4) is 
obtained by putting mqC ( 2 " 2  into this expression, which after rearrangement gives: 
 
   m 6
2exp 2" 2& '
1$ 2
78
98
:8
:8
;8
<8
=8
=8
N
R
. 
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Appendix D: Robustness Tests 
 
(a) The Excess 
The certainty equivalent premium (ADJPREM) for each premium-excess combination is: 
 
   & ' & ' & ' & 'PREMwuqEXCESSPREMwuqADJPREMwu ""$""(" 1 . (D1) 
 
Consumers have a constant relative risk aversion utility function, u w& ' ( w1"? / 1"?& ', where the 
risk parameter is? 6 0 (? %1)  and w is wealth.  Substituting the utility function into (D1), 
rearranging, and taking a second-order Taylor expansion gives: 
 
ADJPREM ( PREM $ q EXCESS $
? q EXCESS2" ADJPREM " PREM& '2) *
2 w " PREM& '
.  (D2) 
 
The adjusted premium is sum of the actual premium, the expected excess amount and a term that 
includes the risk preference parameter ?.  ADJPREM was separately calculated for males and 
females and those aged 25, 40, 55 and 70 years of age, using data on published accident rates. 
Values of ? were taken equal to 0.5 and 1.5, and w equal to £10,000 and £20,000, i.e. about the 
minimum and median wage.  Equation (D2) includes PREMADJ on the right-hand side, but this 
was initially set equal to PREM and iterated, but making no difference to the obtained results.  
 
(b) Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Writing Cqpp "#~  then (8) is & ' & '2 3 RNppmmppmph /~exp~,:~ 11 "( , and assuming there are 
n i.i.d. observations on prices nppp
~,...,~,~ 21  the likelihood function is , 
and the log-likelihood function, l m  is: 
& ' & 1
1
1 ,:
~, pmphpmL r
nr
r
R
(
(
( '
, p1& '
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  .  (D3) & ' & ' RnNnmppmnmppml r
nr
r
r
nr
r
lnln~~ln,
1
1
1
1 "$"$( SS
(
(
(
(
 
To estimate this we write m = ? + @ x, where ? and @ are estimation parameters, and the x are 
the variables determining the search ability, i.e. age (AGE), occupation (OCC) and sex (SEX).  It 
is estimated by running a Stata do-file on a D1 maximum likelihood program (Gould et al, 2006).  
Two simplifications are made.  First, to adjust the prices p~  for the risk associated with each sub-
market, q C, the minimum premium of the price set is used, as the mean premium eliminates the 
variation from the data and it will not converge.  We divide through by this, so that the term 
cancels in (D3) and it is treated as a constant.  Second, in order to achieve convergence the 
variables for N and R terms in (D3) had to added to the regression in the same manner as the ? 
term, but since the individual opt-opt was dropped due to collinearity. 
1p
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